
‘Throughout the whole year, we have memorized our question papers for the exam on India but one fine morning we find our exam to be held on Myanmar!’- Netizens of Bangladesh have been uttering such political humor over social media since the capture of the Maungdaw town of the Rakhine province by Arakan Army (AA) on December 9 of last year. One of the strongest ethnic minority armed groups in Myanmar, Arakan Army has also established total control of the 271-kilometer, i.e., 168-miles long border with Bangladesh.
Earlier in 2024, the group seized Paletwa and Buthidaung, two other townships on the frontier with Bangladesh. With recommendable participation of female soldiers, gender balanced Arakan Army has earned control over 11 of Rakhine’s 17 townships, including one in the neighboring Chin state.
But what implications this ‘fast and steady’ rise of Arakan Army may have upon the existing interim government of Bangladesh, led by the noble laureate economist Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus? How it may affect the different aspects of Bangladesh-Myanmar relationship including the issues like Bangladesh-Myanmar maritime dispute or the Rohingya refugee crisis? Will this rise of Arakan Army create any impact on the St. Martin Island? Before answering all these questions, let us first discuss the genesis of ‘Arakan Army’ in brief details:
Genesis of Arakan Army from the womb of centuries’ long Burma vs. Arakan strife:
We, ordinary Bengalis of Bangladesh, hardly know about any distinction between the ‘Rakhines’ and the ‘Burmese’ and generally we mix-up ‘Arakan’ with ‘Myanmar’ or ‘Rakhines’ with the ‘Burmese.’ For example, the Rakhine girls selling lots of handicraft items in Cox’s Bazar are mostly considered as ‘Girls of the Burmese Market’ by average Bengalis. I, however, came to know the blood-drenched distinction between the ‘Burmese’ and the ‘Rakhines’ in 2006 when conducting a research work on the ‘Rakhine’ indigenous community of Bangladesh with Community Development Center (CODEC), a Chittagong based development organization.
“Although there is a common presumption between ordinary Bengalis/Bangladeshis that Rakhings and Burmese (Bumma) are racially or ethnically identical, but we are very different. Bumma and Rakhaines are two different nationalities of Myanmer. Though we have some similarities in food habit, costume or physical features, there lies gulf of difference between the histories, languages, culture and literature of the two races,” said Agriculturalist U Sit Maung, the Executive Director of Rakhaine Development Foundation (RDF) to me in 2006 when carrying out the research.
“Today’s Myanmer is actually a confederation of a number of nationalities: Karen, Burmese (Bumma), Rakhaines and so many. Ironically enough, we Rakhaines have the script of our own which the Burmese later adopted from us as they have no script of their own; but, now-a-days, the Rakhaine children in Bangladesh consider their own script as Burmese script,” he continued.
Maung, citing from history, also stated that the Rakhaine people lost their freedom to neighboring Burma in 1784 and that resulted in flight of thousands of Rakhaine men and women to greater Chittagong division (including Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Ramu, Teknaf, Maheshkhali & Ukhia) and to what was then Bakherganj or Barisal (including Patuakhali, Rangabali, Barguna & Kuakata) district of Bangladesh.
Jacques Leider, in his article Between Revolt and Normality: Arakan after the Burmese Conquest, writes: ‘The conquest of Arakan was the great military exploit of King Bodawphaya though it was not himself but his son, the heir apparent, who was responsible for the military campaign .--- Many Arakanese left their home country in 1794 and 1797/98 as a consequence of the Burmese policy of systematically deporting people to Burma.’
Maung Ba Aung, in his book Bangladesh-e Rakhaine Samproday: Itihas, Oitijhjha o Jibon Dhara, narrates as he translates from King Bering by B.R. Pearn: “After the killing of Arakanese king Thama Da, the Burmese troops as led by King Bodawphaya, occupied the whole Arakan and created an atmosphere of terror with ruthless looting and plundering, murder and torture. It is basically to save their life and to retain some semblance of human dignity and freedom and to protect the Arakani ways a huge number of Rakhaines arrived in –what was then-- South Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts regions and which were already being governed by the British East India Company.”
(‘The Rakhines of the Patuakhali and Bargona Region, Audity Falguni Gayen: pages 2-12, published by CODEC in 2006).
Hence the genesis of Arakan Army lies in 240 years’ long history of subjugation (1784-2024), defeat and humiliation of the ‘Rakhine’ by ‘Myanmar.’ Here I insert a little timeline of Arakan Army’s establishment, gradual evolution and today’s success:
Timeline of Arakan Army: Their fight with Junta of Myanmar, frontier forces of the neighbouring countries and Rohingya Muslims
15th April of 2009: Arakan Army was established together with its political wing (the United League of Arakan- ULA), its ‘temporary headquarters’ being located in Laiza, Kachin State of Myanmar.
2010: Arakan Army (AA) fought besides KIA against the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) in the Kachin conflict.
June 2011: After undertaking training, the group decided to return back to Arakan State and fight for autonomy but outbreak of fighting in Kachin State hindered them in doing so. So they started fighting in support of the Kachin Independent Army (KI).
2014: Arakan Army commenced a settlement in Rakhine State adjacent to the Myanmar-Bangladesh frontier and another near the border of Thai. Most Arakan Army soldiers were originally trained at the KIA Military Academy. Since 2014, the AA has set up its own training camps in Rakhine State. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, the AA had more than 1,500 troops in 2014, including personnel stationed in the Rakhine State near Myanmar's border with Bangladesh.
February 2015: AA waged war with the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic armed group, and its ally the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in their fight with the Myanmar Army. Hundreds of the Tatmadaw's soldiers reportedly died in this internal war.
April 2015: AA had clashes with the Myanmar Army in Kyauktaw Township of Rakhine State and Paletwa Township of Chin State.
20 August 2015: Arakan Army had clash with a group of Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), after ten of their horses were seized by the BGB earlier that day.
27 August 2015: Clash erupted between AA and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) forces, with both sides shooting at each other near the Boro Modak area of Thanch in the Banderban district, adjacent to the share Myanmar-Bangladesh frontier.
September 2015: The Irrawaddy stated that the AA had more than 2,500 troops and 10,000 personnel in their civilian wing.
December 2015: The Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army got involved in several days of war around 60 kilometres (37 mi) north of Sittwe at the border between Kyauktaw and Mrauk U townships.
2016: After the 2016 conflict in Rakhine state, AA became more profoundly engrossed in the Arakan region. After clashes between Rohingya insurgents and Burmese security forces in northern Rakhine State in October 2016, the Arakan Army (AA) released a press statement where they termed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army-ARSA as "savage Bengali Muslim terrorists" and the violence as "rampage of the Bengali Islamic fundamentalist militants in northern Arakan."
November 2017: Arakan Army (AA) was involved in heavy clashes with the Tatmadaw in Chin State, in which 11 Tatmadaw soldiers were killed. There had been popular support for the AA in Mrauk U and a number of men from the town recently joined the group, BBC mentioned.
21 December 2018: Myanmar Army proclaimed a 4-months’ long unilateral ceasefire in five conflict areas, mentioning it would hold talks with non-signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) during the ceasefire period.
January 2019: AA started attacks on state security forces and the Myanmar army replied to intensify the clashes. AA has reportedly got Chinese-made weapons, such as surface-to-surface missiles utilized during an attack on the Myanmar Navy in 2019.
On 4 January 2019, around 300 members of the Arakan Army launched pre-dawn attacks on four border police outposts—Kyaung Taung, Nga Myin Taw, Ka Htee La and Kone Myint—in northern Buthidaung Township. Thirteen members of the Border Guard Police (BGP) were killed and nine others were injured, whilst 40 firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition were taken by the Arakan Army.
March-April 2019: On 9 March around 60 AA revels launched an evening attack on Yoe-ta-yoke Police Station. According to a leaked combat report, nine policemen were killed, two were injured. In April, around 200 AA insurgents attacked the No. 31 Police Security Unit at 10 p.m. The Tatmadaw retaliated with fighter jets, bombing AA positions until 6 a.m. the next day.
2020: On 6 February 2020, the Arakan Army launched an attack on a Tatmadaw outpost on a bank of Kaladan River in Rakhine State. Fighting lingered for weeks and touched the peak in the second week of March when the Arakan Army claimed it had captured 36 soldiers, including a battalion commander.
Myanmar government declared AA as a terrorist organization. In the same year, India held China responsible for supporting rebel groups, including the UWSA and AA, through providing them weapons and offering hideouts within Indian territory. However, there is not much proofs about direct Chinese involvement, as Chinese armament may have been provided by the UWSA, which has a closer tie with China.
26 May 2020: Arakan Army released a statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of Burmese Government administration and Burmese Armed Forces from Arakan.
June 2020: The AA chief claimed that the group has more than 20,000 soldiers.
Late 2020: On decline of the central government’s control in northern Rakhine, AA reached a ceasefire. AA endeavoured to fill-up this vacuum period for next months with nation-building works like operating COVID-19 vaccination programme.
August 2021: The Arakan Army demanded that they advocate for the self-determination for the multi-ethnic Arakanese population as well as the safeguarding and promotion of the national identity and cultural heritage of the Arakan people.
December 2021: AA chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing claimed that the AA had grown to 30,000 troops.
July 2022: Ceasefire collapsed and armed clashes restarted in July 2022 after a Tatmadaw airstrike against an AA base.
November 2022: AA and Myanmar government agreed to a temporal ceasefire in November 2022 for humanitarian causes.
November 2023: The ceasefire continued till November 2023 when AA launched a series of attacks as part of Operation 1027 by Three Brotherhood Alliance (a military coalition comprising of three ethnic, armed organizations in Myanmar: the Arakan Army-AA, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) against Tatmadaw).
February 2024: AA took all of Mrauk-U district of Arakan by 6 February 2024. By this time, Twan Mrat Naing claimed that the AA had grown to at least 38000 troops. Anthony Davis, an expert in military and security, rejected this claim and estimated that it has at least 15,000 troops in Chin land and Rakhine State, and around 1,500 in Kachin State and Shan State.
10 April 2024: AA declared it was changing its name from Rakhain Tatdaw to Arakha Tatdaw ). Spokesperson U Khaing Thu Kha, explained "Arakan" represents everybody living in Rakhine State, irrespective of background. Despite declaration of diversity, there are proofs of war crimes against Rohingyas even after such announcement. However, AA continues to use the name "Arakan Army" on its English website.
December 2024: AA continues on capturing towns, taking control of Thandwe in July and Maungdaw in December 2024.
December 9 of 2024: AA established full control over the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.
(Source: Slightly abridged and paraphrased from Wikipedia).
How Arakan Army’s advancement can affect Bangladesh?
Although ‘anti-India’ sentiment works as a tonic to get quick popularity in Bangladeshi politics despite India’s all out support in our Liberation War 1971 or profound reliance of Bangladeshis on India for every daily essential or medical treatment (but also we have bi-lateral complexities with India like water sharing in common rivers or occasional killings in Indo-Bangla frontier), Bangladesh-Myanmar relationship too never has been smooth but Bangladesh has hardly been that much vocal (as Bangladeshis become volatile in every major and minor dealings with India) despite lots of ‘hard’ measures adopted by Myanmar with Bangladesh so far.
Prior to assessing the probable impact of Arakan army’s ‘fast and steady’ win in the region on Bangladesh, let us look at two major points of Bangladesh-Myanmar relationship. How has been our relationship so far?
1. Rohingya Refugee Crisis: It is historically settled that the Rohingyas have evolved and flourished in the Arakans as a “nation” from certain centuries ago. Basically, the Rohingyas are a mixture race. This race was evolved during 7th-8th century. It originated through inter-mingling of the Muslims from the middle-east and the local Arakanese people. Later this mixed race emerged in its full identity by 13th-14th century who have been a blend/fusion of the Chittagonians, Rakhines, Arakanese, Burmese, Bengalis, Indians as well as the migrants from the middle- east. The Rohingyas had a kingdom of their own from 15th-18th century in the then Arakan. We know how the literary chronicles of the ancient and medieval ages often serve as substitute of the history. The real identity of the Rohingyas, thus, can be known from the “Appreciation of the Rosang King (Raj)” episode from “Padmavati,” translation of a romance written in verses by Malik Muhammad Jayasi, by Alaol the great Bengali poet of the medieval age.
The Rohingya crisis has commenced since 1942, according to the historical information. Around 14 large operations so far have been conducted against the Rohingya people from 1948-1978 on the basis of the planning of the Burmese (present Myanmer) government. Of those, the major ones are: BTF Operation, Combined Immigration and Army Operation, U.M.P. Operation, Captain Htin Kyaw Operation, Shwe Kyi Operation, Kyi Gan Operation, Nagazin Ka Operation, Myat Mon Operation, Major Aung Than Operation, Sabe Operation and Nagamin (Dragon) Operation.
Father of the Nation and the then President of Bangladesh Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman conveyed “ultimatum” to the Burmese government with an emphatic call to end torture against and repatriate the Rohingya refugees in their homes in 1974. Myanmar government then became bound to resettle the Rohingya refugees in Arakan.
Only within three years of receiving ultimatum from the government of Bangladesh that the Myanmar military junta launched another horrendous operation against the Rohingyas which was named “King Dragon (Nagamin) operation.” Around 250,000 Rohingyas had taken refuge in Bangladesh during this operation period.
Although the Myanmer government repatriated around 200,000 Rohingyas in 1978 after “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Bangladesh-Myanmer Refugee Repatriation” was signed, the military junta of Myanmar did not keep their promise too long. Cruelty and torture against the Rohingyas began again just within two years of the resettlement of the Rohingyas.
Again a huge number of the Rohingyas took shelter in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh as they crossed the Naaf river at the Teknaf border area during 1988-90. Many of them did set up permanent abodes here and started living. By November 1990, the Rohingyas began arriving in Bangladesh by and large.
2. After long and tenacious efforts of the Bangladesh government and with support from the international community that the Myanmer government consented to repatriation process of their Rohingya refugees in April 28 of 1992 but hardly they implemented it. After a Rakhine woman was raped in June 2012 by a handful of Rohingya miscreants, Rakhine-Rohingya violence was unleashed again. At some point of this escalation of violence, both the Myanmer Army and the Rakhines began ethnical cleansing and oppression against the Rohingyas. Around one lakh (100,000) Rohingyas entered Bangladesh during that period. The largest exodus of the Rohingyas, however, commenced in August 25 of 2017.
According to UNHCR web-site (last updated on August 22 of 2024): ‘The Rohingya have suffered decades of violence, discrimination and persecution in Myanmar. Their largest exodus began in August 2017 after a massive wave of violence broke out in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, forcing more than 742,000 people - half of them children - to seek refuge in Bangladesh. Entire villages were burned to the ground, thousands of families were killed or separated and massive human rights violations were reported.
More than 1.3 million people were displaced within Myanmar in 2023 due to escalating violence following the military takeover in February 2021. By the end of 2023, there were more than 2.6 million internally displaced people (IDP) in the country. An additional 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar are hosted in other countries, including nearly 1 million stateless Rohingya refugees who are living in Bangladesh. Most are settled in and around Kutupalong and Nayapara refugee camps in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar region — some of the largest and most densely populated camps in the world. ---In 2023, one Rohingya died or went missing for every eight who attempted the journey.
More than 75 percent of the refugee population are women and children. The current refugee population accounts for one-third of the total population in the Cox’s Bazar region, making support to host communities essential for peaceful coexistence.’
It should be noted that the recently ousted, former Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina extended her unequivocal support to 742,000 Rohingya refugees in September 2017.
2. Bangladesh-Myanmar Maritime Dispute including the claim over St. Martin Island:
That the fishermen of Myanmar often enter into our sea boundaries and abduct Bangladeshi fishermen or extort money from them make frequent headlines in Bangladeshi newspapers and Myanmar hardly has expressed sorrow to Bangladesh for any of the unexpected conduct or treatment on their behalf. Basically, ‘the maritime boundary dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal is a complex issue that involves international law, geopolitics, and the quest for natural resources,’ observes Policy Analyst Jared Bissinger in his ‘The Maritime Boundary Dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar: Motivations, Potential Solutions, and Implications, July 2010/Asia Policy 10 (1): 103-142).
The first step in border delimitation between modern-day Bangladesh (before its independence from Pakistan in 1971) and Myanmar occurred on 9 May 1966 with the Naaf River Boundary Agreement.
However, this established a border only along the Naaf River delta, ending at the river's mouth onto to the Bay of Bengal. Between 1974 and 1986, a series of eight rounds of bilateral negotiations convened to delimit the territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf boundaries. At the second round of talks on 23 November 1974, the respective delegates signed the Agreed Minutes between the Bangladesh Delegation and the Burmese Delegation regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Two Countries (the ‘1974 Agreed Minutes’).
Commodore Chit Hliang, Navy Vice Chief-of-Staff, led the Myanmar delegation, while the Ambassador to Myanmar, Kwaja Mohammad Kaiser, led the Bangladesh delegation. Special Chart 114 was attached to the 1974 Agreed Minutes and graphically illustrated the boundary, which followed a line parallel to the Myanmar Rakhine state coast and equidistant between that coast and St. Martin's Island, which belongs to Bangladesh (Judgement 2012: 25).
Over 30 years later, the dispute re-emerged. Jared Bissinger, a research fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, trail-blazed the field in terms of theorizing the issue of causality in the re-emergence. He argues that the dispute resurfaced because of two primary factors: new discoveries of hydrocarbon gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal and increased demand for natural gas in both countries. The majority of the hydrocarbon gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal were discovered between 2002 and 2007 (Bissinger 2010: 113). While Bangladesh, which is plagued by frequent power outages, is sourcing energy sources to alleviate its domestic power shortage, Myanmar is more likely to export the natural gas to both China and India (Case Study: The Myanmar and Bangladesh Maritime Boundary Dispute in the Bay of Bengal and Its Implications for South China Sea Claims - Ravi A. Balaram, 2012).
According to Sarah Watson, an Associate Fellow in the Wadhwani Chair for U.S.-India Policy Studies at CSIS: ‘ …The two countries had irreconcilable views of their respective maritime boundaries but the dispute largely remained on the back burner until late 2008, when South Korea’s Daewoo, at the behest of Myanmar, began natural gas exploration in waters claimed by Bangladesh. A few weeks later, Bangladesh submitted its continental shelf claim to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Both countries mobilized naval forces in the disputed area and the conflict narrowly escaped escalation.’
‘The ruling was noteworthy in part for the court’s decision that it had jurisdiction to decide not only competing claims to waters but also the continental shelf, and for the creation of a “grey area” that is on Bangladesh’s side of the boundary line drawn by the court but within the potential 200-nautical-mile EEZ of Myanmar. In this grey area, Bangladesh controls the seabed but Myanmar the superjacent waters. Similar grey areas have since been created by other bodies, including in the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2014 ruling on the India/Bangladesh boundary dispute,’ Sarah wrote.
Equally important was the court’s treatment of St. Martin’s Island, a small island belonging to Bangladesh but located directly west of Myanmar. The Tribunal gave full effect to the island when delimiting the two countries’ territorial seas, but did not allow Bangladesh to use the island as a base point when marking the equidistance line between the two states’ EEZs and continental shelves. The decision also minimized the island’s importance by declining to identify it as a “relevant circumstance” that should be considered when making adjustments to the boundary line.’ she added (https://amti.csis.org/the-bangladeshmyanmar-maritime-dispute-lessons-for-peaceful-resolution/).
Situation of Bangladesh will be better or worse with Arakan Army?
In sharp response to Arakan Army’s almost total control over the Rakhine Province that the Myanmar government has launched its largest warship on December 24 to observe the country’s 77th Navy Day, according to a news report of India.com.
During the occasion, two 63-meter anti-submarine destroyer ships too were inaugurated and Myanmar Navy has ascribed it as a symbol of the navy's promise to maritime security and innovation, the report of India.com further mentions.
Earlier Arakan Army posted on the Telegram messaging app on December 9 that it had taken more than 30 military outposts, except the army’s western command, which controls Rakhine and the southern part of neighboring Chin state, as well as the country’s territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal, according to AP Bangkok on December 9.
The latest fighting in Rakhine, in addition, has heightened fears of a renewal of orchestrated violence against members of the Muslim Rohingya minority, similar to one that evicted at least 740,000 Rohingyas to in 2017 towards Bangladesh.
‘Rohingya have lived in Myanmar for generations, but they are widely regarded by many in the country’s Buddhist majority, including members of the Rakhine minority, as having illegally migrated from Bangladesh. The Rohingya face a great amount of prejudice and are generally denied citizenship and other basic rights,’ the AP Bangkok report (December 9 of last year) mentioned.
Meantime, The Arakan Army said on December 10 of last year that it had ordered the suspension of all sorts of water transports across the Naf River because police and local Muslims (Rohingyas) associated with the Myanmar army were trying to leave by boat to Bangladesh.
The rebel group has been held responsible for marked human rights violations, specially regarding its seizure of the town of Buthidaung in mid-May, when the group allegedly forced approximately 200,000 residents, mainly Rohingyas, to escape for life and then gutting down majority of the buildings. AA was also criticized for launching attacks on Rohingya civilians in Maungdaw by August.
On the other hand, Bangladesh too is definitely strengthening security along her frontier with Myanmar, according to a report in Arab News on December 24.
“We don’t have any direct contact with the Arakan Army as they are not any legal or recognized entity ... We have strengthened our monitoring and patrols in border areas to prevent any sort of further intrusion,” said Maj. Syed Ishtiaq Morshed, commander of the Border Guard Bangladesh in Teknaf subdistrict, which shares a border with Myanmar, opposite the town of Maungdaw.
Morshed told Arab News that the Bangladesh Navy, Naval Police, Coast Guard, and the Rapid Action Battalion elite police force have also been deployed to the border region to “prevent any law and order situation” inside Bangladeshi territory.
Bangladesh’s pledge to undertake all the required steps to protect its 271 km border with Myanmar resonated through Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mohammad Rafiqul Alam or Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain, according to another news report in Dhaka Tribune on December 24.
"I informed Myanmar (in Bangkok) that the border is no longer under your control. It is now controlled by non-state actors like the Arakan Army. As a state, we cannot engage with them. Myanmar must find a way to resolve the issues related to the border and Rakhine," Hossain told reporters in Dhaka after returning from informal consultations held in Thailand, according to the Dhaka Tribune report.
In the last seven years from 2017-2024, not a single Rohingya went back to Myanmar, the report further confirmed.
We must not forget that recently Mr. Hossain also could not help commenting that ‘Many a number of foreign powers are watching upon Bay of Bengal.’
Russian geo-political strategy analyst Andrew Korbykov, on the other hand, opines, ‘Lost amidst the news of Syria’s epic collapse was the Arakan Army’s (AA) capture of the Myanmarese-Bangladeshi border last week, which is the first full frontier to fall to rebel forces since the latest phase of the world’s longest-running civil war began in early 2021. ---The reason why this development is so significant is because the AA previously accused Bangladesh of backing jihadist Rohingya terrorists against their home region’s Buddhists, which a source reiterated in comments to The New Indian Express after taking control of the border. The AA is comprised of Buddhists while the Rohingya are a Muslim minority in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (considered by the AA to be Arakan) who originated from Bangladesh. Their conflict is a thus “clash of civilizations” in a way.’
‘Former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina claimed that one of the reasons for her foreign-backed ouster was that an unnamed Western country wanted to punish her for refusing to allow it to open up a military base. Most observers intuited that she was referring to the US. An exacerbation of Bangladesh’s southern border crisis with the AA, possibly spun by Dhaka as “unprovoked genocidal aggression by a Myanmarese-based terrorist group”, could accelerate talks on a US base for “self-defense” purposes,’ Korbykov added (The Arakan Army’s Capture of the Bangladeshi Border Could Prompt a Crisis with Dhaka | Asia-Pacific Research.
AA takes control of Rakhine at such a time when two millions of people in that province of Myanmar face an oncoming famine, as reported by UN last month.
Though initially AA vowed for inclusion and participation of all the ethnic and religious groups in Arakan, but later AA mentioned that it was attacking ‘regime and allied Rohingya militia from the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Arsa), and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) as they fled the base’, according to the AP Bangkok report on December 9.
Since after the fall of Biden regime in USA and Donald Trump’s second term win as the US President may mark some changes in US foreign policy and how that will affect the former Democrat-supported present interim government of Bangladesh should be noted with patience and caution. Trump has already mentioned that he does not bother about what Russia or Vladimir Putin wishes to do about Ukraine or with the world and he prefers business to war for economic reconstruction of USA which helped to achieve the sheer mandate in USA.
Hence the rise of Arakan Army (AA) at such a crucial point of world politics (President Trump is going to take oath on January 20) keeps us all in suspense.
*The author is a researcher and fiction writer. She can be reached at [email protected]. Views expressed in this article are the author's own.*